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**Winning the War and the Relationships:
Preparing Military Officers for Negotiations with
Non-Combatants**

Orly Ben-Yoav Nobel, Brian Wortinger, and Sean Hannah
United States Military Academy, West Point

August 2007

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**U.S. Army Research Institute
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Portions of this research were presented at the APA Division 21 & 19 Annual Symposium on Applied Experimental Research at George Mason University in 2006 and at the 2006 Military Psychology Center meeting in Israel. Special thanks to Michelle Zbylut, Stan Halpin, and Allison Abbe of the Army Research Institute and Angie Karrasch of the Center for Army Leadership for their thoughtful comments on this work.

WINNING THE WAR AND THE RELATIONSHIPS: PREPARING MILITARY OFFICERS FOR NEGOTIATIONS WITH NON COMBATANTS

EXECUTIVE SUMMARY

Research Requirement:

Current operations in Iraq and Afghanistan involving counterinsurgency, peace-keeping, stability and support missions and nation building have increased interest in cross-cultural negotiation skills as a central competency of military leadership. This report develops a conceptual framework capturing the unique characteristics of negotiations between military personnel and local civilians that can guide the design of negotiation training programs for officers preparing to deploy.

Procedure:

In depth interviews were conducted with 20 Lieutenants and 16 Captains who had returned recently from deployments to Iraq. The interview protocol included a script of 25 questions presented to officers addressing: (1) the type of context and situations in which negotiations took place, (2) the primary types of issues being negotiated, (3) the location and safety considerations during negotiations, (4) any language and cultural differences experienced, (5) their level of trust in Iraqis and factors contributing to the development of that trust, (6) the type and timing of concession-making involved, (7) the degree of openness and information exchange experienced, (8) any factors that helped move the two parties toward agreement, (9) the types and impacts of advanced preparation, and (10) the type of influence techniques employed. Interviews were examined for common content, themes, and issues.

Findings:

Content analysis indicated that negotiations with civilians focused on rebuilding projects, security, and civil affairs issues. Key challenges reported by officers included (1) the need to negotiate and mediate in the face of sectarian loyalties, (2) ethical dilemmas, (3) the development of work arrangements in the face of conflicting cultural values and norms, (4) negotiating in the face of threat and determining the appropriate use of power, (5) emotional self-regulation, and (6) adaptive response to a range of conflicting responsibilities. Iraqi negotiation techniques appeared consistent with non-Western assumptions concerning the goals and tactics of negotiation.

Utilization and Dissemination of Findings:

This research summarizes officer perceptions of Iraqi negotiation strategies and groups those perceptions into a conceptual framework. This research can be used to guide negotiation and cultural awareness instruction for pre-deployment training.

WINNING THE WAR AND THE RELATIONSHIPS: PREPARING MILITARY OFFICERS FOR NEGOTIATIONS WITH NON COMBATANTS

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INTRODUCTION

Military missions have grown in complexity in recent years to involve a mix of peace building tasks (e.g. peace-keeping or nation building) and warfighting responsibilities (e.g., peace enforcement or combating insurgency). This complexity requires Soldiers at all levels to integrate tactical proficiency with the leveraging of nonmilitary advantages, including the building of trust and alliances with local groups and individuals (Kifner, 2006; Scales 2006; Wong 2004). Winning “hearts and minds” and developing collaborative relationships with local civilians can be essential for the advancement of peace and stability as well as for the collection of information, or to align local support necessary to succeed in both warfighting and low intensity operations.

The growing interest in establishing and maintaining cooperative relationships with local civilians has focused primarily on the need to enhance Soldiers’ cultural awareness, including basic knowledge of cultural history (e.g. ethnic diversity), manners and traditions (e.g. social structure, role of religion and religious leaders), style of communication (e.g. how to avoid offensive body language and gestures), and basic language skills (Brown, 2007; Gooren, 2006; Kifner, 2006; Scales, 2006). This paper points to the importance of going beyond the development of cultural awareness and focuses instead on those negotiation skills required to solve conflicts and develop working agreements necessary to foster collaboration with local civilians in complex circumstances. To accomplish missions involving both warfighting and peace building, Soldiers must utilize a wide spectrum of responses, ranging from situational awareness and aggressive warfighting to what may be experienced as the antithetical competencies of mediation and cross-cultural negotiation (Goodwin, 2005; Ben-Yoav Nobel et al., 2006).

Negotiation can be thought of as an effort to resolve a perceived conflict of interest by means of conversation (Pruitt, 1981, 1998). It represents a unique form of social interaction or decision making that involves more than one party, where the parties hold potentially conflicting interests; yet enough interdependence and mutual interests to motivate them to remain in the relationship and complete the exchange (Bazerman & Lewicki, 1983). In most negotiations, the parties first verbalize contradictory demands, and at least one of them attempts to persuade the other to change his/her demands or ideas. Successful negotiations occur when the parties move towards finding common ground and agreement by a process of exchange and concession-making and/or through a search for new alternatives. Negotiations become cross-cultural when the parties involved belong to different cultures and, as a result, have culturally-influenced differences in the way they interpret and execute the fundamental processes of bargaining (Lewicki, Saunders, & Barry, 2006).

Negotiation theory and research focuses on two central paradigms. The *distributive framework* views negotiation situations as a win-lose, adversarial situation where one party’s gain is the other party’s loss. This perspective emphasizes bargaining tactics aimed to claim

value by lowering the opponent's aspirations or leveraging one's power to maximize personal gains (Lax & Sebenius, 1986). Distributive bargaining is most appropriate when time or resources are limited, when the other party adopts distributive tactics, and when future interaction with the opponent is not likely to occur (Lewicki et al., 2006). Conversely, *integrative bargaining* promotes a win-win approach to negotiation situations and includes a variety of techniques aimed to create value; that is, to uncover solutions that are likely to maximize the benefit of both parties (Fisher & Ury, 1981; Pruitt, 1983). Unlike distributive negotiation which is often characterized by suspicion and mistrust, integrative bargaining tactics, when adopted bilaterally, are often associated with greater openness and trust. In turn, openness and trust facilitates problem-solving behavior and enables the discovery of mutually satisfying agreements. Creating agreements that are beneficial for both parties is often accomplished by identifying more resources or by developing new ways for sharing or coordinating the use of available resources (Lewicki et al., 2006). Notwithstanding the conceptual distinction between the two perspectives, most negotiation situations involve some elements of both distributive and integrative processes.

The use of collaborative negotiation processes and the development of integrative agreements are likely to create order and stability, foster social harmony and reduce the likelihood of future conflict (Rubin, Pruitt, & Kim, 1994). This suggests that if permitted by the situation, integrative negotiation is preferable to distributive bargaining for U.S. military personnel to employ in dealing with local civilians. Such an approach is more likely to satisfy both parties' needs, and as a result, support the U.S. interests to win the support of and build long-lasting collaboration with members of the local population.

THE CURRENT RESEARCH

Military negotiation has been a subject of limited research and analysis, and has not been part of traditional military doctrine (Goodman, 2005). The limited negotiation training that characterizes most military pre-deployment preparations (Brown, 2007; Goodman, 2005; Gordon, 2006) is likely to encourage Soldiers to rely on familiar and well-rehearsed tactical considerations and actions in interpreting and responding to conflict situations (Ben-Yoav Nobel et al., 2006). These familiar and habituated behavioral repertoires may be encoded as highly-accessible mental scripts that when activated, drive future behavior (Gioia & Poole, 1984). Since tactical military competencies are rooted in warfighting, it is reasonable to assume that the salience of an aggressive, "tactical mind set" may increase Soldiers' inclination to adopt less effective competitive negotiation strategies rather than collaborative approaches when attempting to resolve conflicts or negotiate agreements with members of the local population.

The purpose of this exploratory qualitative investigation was to develop a conceptual framework for the analysis of the unique challenges and characteristics associated with negotiations between military personnel and local non-combatant civilians during stability and support operations. The goal of this conceptual framework was to inform and guide the design of pre-deployment negotiation skills programs preparing Soldiers for stability and support operations during deployment.

This research focuses on the identification of 1) negotiation issues commonly faced, 2) key challenges connected with negotiations over these issues, and 3) the type of negotiation strategies and tactics used by members of the local population in dealing with military officers. The discussion of challenges and negotiation strategies employed by local non-combatants is followed by suggested areas of theory-based knowledge, skill-building or organizational policies that are likely to help prepare officers to perform effectively as Soldier-negotiators.

It should be noted that the themes discussed in this article are based on U.S. Army officers' *perceptions* concerning the issues, challenges, cultural manners and expectations, and Iraqi negotiation and influence tactics. As cultural values, beliefs and behavioral norms are expected to influence basic assumptions about the goals and key aspects of negotiations (Brett & Gelfand, 2004), it is likely that these perceptions may not accurately reflect Iraqis' true motives or intentions. An additional goal of this paper, therefore, was to provide an initial analysis of the potential impact that differences between Western and non-Western culturally based assumptions about negotiations may have on the challenges reported, and on Soldiers' interpretation of influence techniques utilized by their Iraqi counterparts.

METHOD

In-depth 30-minute videotaped interviews were conducted in June 2005 with 36 mid-level and junior officers (20 Lieutenants and 16 Captains) who returned from deployment in Iraq two to three months earlier. The majority of the officers participating in this investigation (68%) were deployed for a period of 12-15 months, 18% were deployed for a longer period, while the remaining 14% were deployed for 8-11 months. All participants held roles or responsibilities during their deployment that included formal and informal negotiations with members of the local Iraqi population. The interview protocol included a script of 25 questions presented to participants addressing a series of topics including:

- The type of context and situations in which negotiations took place
- The primary types of issues being negotiated
- The location and safety considerations during negotiations
- Any language and cultural differences experienced
- Their level of trust in Iraqis and factors contributing to the development of that trust
- The type and timing of concession-making involved
- The degree of openness and information exchange experienced
- Any factors that helped move the two parties toward agreement
- The types and impacts of advanced preparation
- The type of influence techniques employed

Content analysis was performed on the information collected during the interviews. From the responses, researchers identified four key themes that addressed (1) the issues involved in military negotiations with Iraqi civilians, (2) key challenges associated with these negotiations, (3) cultural and situational factors affecting the process, and (4) major Iraqi negotiation tactics used during negotiations with U.S. officers. The findings were later utilized in the development of a cross-cultural, pre-deployment military negotiation training program that

was delivered to officers and non-commission officers of one battalion preparing for deployment in Iraq.

RESULTS

The findings of this investigation are presented in four major sections. We begin with a review of the issues reported to be involved in developing agreements through negotiations between Soldiers and Iraqi civilians. Next we review the challenges reported to be associated with negotiations over these issues and we discuss key research-based knowledge areas and skills that would help prepare officers to address these challenges. In the third section, we discuss the negotiation techniques reportedly employed by Iraqis, and include an analysis of the potential misleading impacts that differences between Western versus non-Western cultural assumptions may have on Soldiers' interpretation of these techniques. Finally, we conclude with an analysis of key knowledge areas and skills that are essential for the design of training programs aimed to prepare officers for negotiations with members of the local population in high risk areas of operation.

Issues Involved in Officers' Negotiations with Iraqi Civilians

Officers reported utilizing negotiation as a means to develop agreements with local leaders or ordinary citizens in three key categories of issues: infrastructure improvement projects, personal and neighborhood security matters, and civil affairs issues. A summary of negotiation issues reported is discussed below and presented in Figure 1.

Negotiation Issues Related to Neighborhood and Institutional Improvement Projects

Issues related to infrastructure improvement projects focused largely on the selection and prioritization of projects, assignment of projects to contractors, and adherence to agreed upon project specifications.

Setting improvement priorities. A significant number of officers participated in neighborhood advisory council meetings (NACs) or district advisory councils (DACs) where they negotiated agreements with local leaders that focused on setting priorities for infrastructure improvement projects funded or implemented by the U.S. military. Officers reported negotiating agreements with leaders who seemed focused primarily on promoting the interests of their own ethnic group, clan or section of the neighborhood with little or no concern for the needs of other groups within the area.

Similarly, several officers responsible for administering emergency relief to academic or other public institutions found their Iraqi counterparts (e.g. key administrators or faculty members) to be mostly concerned with satisfying the immediate needs of specific units or departments with which they were closely affiliated. This came at the cost of focusing on an objective assessment of the institution's long term needs.

In addition to loyalty to one's own clan, neighborhood or religious sect, the demands made by Iraqi counterparts appeared to reflect a power struggle over control of resources and influence among the three main forces of Iraqis vying for local influence: religious leaders, tribal or neighborhood sheiks, and the newly emerging civil authorities representing the central government. Officers found negotiation with religious leaders to be especially difficult as they tended to be less willing to compromise. Sheiks or other neighborhood leaders were somewhat less demanding, but were more demanding than ordinary citizens.

<p>I. Negotiation issues related to neighborhood and institutional improvement projects</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Setting improvement priorities • Selecting and managing contractors and allocating funds and resources • Resolving disagreements concerning adherence to standards and compliance with negotiated agreements <p>II. Security matters</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Setting improvement priorities • Traffic control checkpoints (e.g. Green Zone) • Insufficient documentation to cross into certain restricted areas • Addressing human needs when civilians movements were restricted during surveillance or other security operations • Neighborhood advisory council leaders demanding pay to support their own personal protection • Permits to carry weapons • Local religious leaders demanding stronger security measures (e.g. close off street areas around mosques with concertina wire) • Negotiating agreements with local sheiks promising to use their influence to ensure security • Negotiating regarding compensation or benefits in exchange for information. • Utilizing exchange and negotiation techniques in the process of conducting cordon and search operations focusing on intelligence gathering • Utilizing influence and negotiation techniques in the process of interrogating suspects captured immediately after an attack on U.S. military personnel <p>III. Civil affairs issues</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Obtaining information about detainees • Requesting release of detainees • Compensation for loss of life • Compensation for loss of residential or commercial property
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Figure 1. Summary of negotiation issues.

Selecting and managing contractors and allocating funds and resources. Local leaders often exerted pressure on U.S. officers to allow them to determine what local contractors would be hired to perform infrastructure improvement projects in their neighborhoods. They often pressed U.S. officers to hire contractors with whom they had personal familiarity or connections. In monitoring work progress, officers sometimes found that contractors chosen by community leaders deviated from agreed upon project specifications or timelines in response to requests made by these local leaders. This situation required officers to confront both the contractors and the community leaders to ensure the implementation of agreed upon plans. At the same time, some officers indicated that when they selected contractors who were not the preferred choice of community leaders, projects appeared to get sabotaged or prolonged by complaints concerning the quality of the work or the inconveniences caused by it.

Resolving disagreements concerning adherence to standards and compliance with negotiated agreements. Multiple officers found Iraqis to hold a relaxed attitude concerning adherence to the terms of negotiated agreements. Contractors often did not meet standards or deadlines set for projects and tended to attribute their failures to reasons outside their control.

Closely related to insufficient commitment to the terms of agreements, many officers reported finding Iraqis as a group to not be as detailed-oriented as they were. When developing an agreement, Iraqis appeared to focus primarily on the general terms and not as much on details concerning project or product specifications or timelines.

Negotiation Issues Related to Security Concerns and Operations

The second primary area of negotiation topics concerned a wide range of security-related issues. These issues included negotiating with civilians attempting to cross checkpoints with incomplete or inadequate permits, reaching agreements with local residents over their ability to satisfy human needs when civilians movements were restricted during surveillance or other security operations, dealing with neighborhood advisory council leaders who demanded pay to support their own personal protection, negotiating over Iraqis' desire to receive permits to carry weapons, meetings with local religious leaders concerning their demand for greater security measures (e.g. close off street areas around mosques), meeting with local sheiks about neighborhood security arrangements or intelligence gathering, and developing agreements with informants regarding compensation or benefits in exchange for information. Several officers indicated that they were engaged in some form of exchange and negotiation even in the midst of cordon and search operations focusing on intelligence gathering, or while in the process of interrogating suspects captured immediately after an attack on U.S. military personnel.

Negotiation Issues Related to Civil Affairs

The third topic area of negotiations concerned civil affairs. Key issues included attempts by Iraqis to gain the release of or obtain information about detainees. Iraqis also often demanded compensation for damages caused to houses or for loss of commercial property due to infrastructure improvement projects, or as a result of security operations.

In sum, there appears to be a wide range of issues involved in negotiations between military personnel and local civilians in stability and support operations within areas characterized by immature or weak local civil authority and administration organizations. Most officers interviewed for this investigation reported that they faced these negotiation tasks with limited or no prior educational or professional training to confront the challenges they encountered.

Negotiation Challenges

We turn now from outlining the primary topics of negotiations that emerged from the interviews to discuss various challenges faced in the context of negotiations. Officers reported a wide spectrum of challenges that they faced in trying to accomplish the dual goals of negotiating mutually satisfying agreements and fostering collaborative relationships with members of the local population. These challenges appeared to fall into five main categories: (1) negotiation and mediation in the face of ethnic strife, (2) ethical judgments in the face of conflicting cultural values and norms, (3) negotiating work agreements in the face of diverse cultural values and norms, (4) negotiating in the face of threat and volatility and balancing the use of power and collaborative gestures, and (5) personal self-regulation and adaptability during negotiations. The following sections of this paper describe these challenges along with suggested areas of theory-based knowledge and skill building that may be addressed in a training program designed to help prepare officers for dealing with these challenges.

Negotiation and Mediation in the Face of Ethnic Strife

Officers reported the need to assume an active facilitation and mediation role as discussions between rival or competing neighborhood leaders, concerned primarily with the welfare of their immediate clan, turned occasionally into heated debates. Officers were forced to diffuse disputants' anger, reinstate calm, and refocus the discussion on broader community and institutional goals. Officers reported utilizing primarily self-taught, improvised and trial-and-error based negotiation and mediation techniques as they looked for ways to bridge conflicting demands among the neighborhood leaders and to promote a larger more integrated community perspective.

Officers observed that the lack of unity among clans or sectarian groups caused all negotiated agreements with Iraqi counterparts to have tactical, operational and political/strategic implications. They stressed the need to consider the potential impact of negotiated agreements on the relationships among local groups and their attitudes toward U.S. forces. They recognized the imperative of maintaining an impartial position and image in their relationships with various groups in order to ensure the success of their peace-keeping and nation-building missions.

Officers also talked about the challenge of assuming an impartial stand in the face of pressures from competing groups trying to maximize their benefits. A few noted the need to ensure that U.S. forces are not used by competing groups to "settle accounts" and establish dominance. This was done on several occasions when members of certain villages or clans provided U.S. troops with information that led to security operations of limited or no value, but served the desire of the informants to disturb or settle accounts with others.

Training and development focus: To ensure their success in maintaining impartiality, officers emphasized the need for U.S. military personnel to learn to obtain information and continually update their knowledge of the key interests and the complex relationships between dominant groups as well as leading figures in their areas of operation.

To address the challenge of developing impartial agreements that emphasize community rather than sectarian interests, a military negotiation instructional program would need to emphasize the development of effective mediation skills. The program could provide a review of specific challenges associated with different phases of mediation processes and teach officers the skills to address these challenges (Moore, 1996). Key knowledge areas and skills would include the need to secure acceptance despite local perceptions of officers as part of an occupation force, enhancing perceived impartiality and expertise in the eyes of the conflicting parties (Arnold, 2000; Carnevale & Colon, 1990; Pruitt & Carnevale, 1992). Other important targets of training could include how to best sequence the issues to be discussed, determine underlying needs of both parties, manage the exchange of proposals between the disputing parties, assess areas of common ground, and determine where each party may be willing to make concessions (Kelman, 1996; Rubin, 1980; Weiss, 2003; Zubek, Pruitt, Peirce, McGillicuddy, & Syna, 1992). Officers must also learn to apply forceful, proactive mediation techniques in the face of intense and hostile conflicts and a more relaxed, facilitative role when dealing with less intense disputes (Lim & Carnevale, 1990).

Ethical Judgment in the Face of Conflicting Cultural Values and Norms

Officers reported facing several ethical dilemmas focusing on the use of resources by local community leaders. A key dilemma resulted from a lack of control over local leaders' use of resources and power derived from contact with U.S. forces. Consistent with earlier research addressing the social structure of Middle Eastern communities (Abu Nimer, 1996), officers found neighborhoods within cities, towns, or villages to be under the influence of leaders representing specific clans or ethnic groups. U.S. Soldiers who provided local leaders with valuable resources or special privileges in exchange for their promise to align community support for American efforts indicated that they could not be totally sure if these resources were distributed fairly or ethically among local residents. They were concerned that these resources may be used by at least some leaders to advance their own wealth and position of power.

A related ethical dilemma focused on the development of agreements in the face of cultural norms embracing personal empowerment and nepotism. Officers reported finding that nepotism and "Bakshis" (i.e. kickback payments) appeared common and culturally normative in Iraqi society. These practices appeared especially likely in the hiring of local contractors to perform neighborhood improvement projects. As gaining the support of community leaders seemed instrumental to strengthening stability within neighborhoods, officers faced the dilemma of deciding to what extent they would let these leaders influence the hiring of contractors. This is especially troubling since nepotism contradicts the military rule of hiring contractors who provide the highest objective value.

Training and development focus: Middle Eastern cultural and social norms that emphasize the preservation of family, clan or village unity as a way to avoid diluting power and

solidarity in the face of external threats may explain the custom of awarding contracts and benefits to relatives and acquaintances (Abu Nimer, 1996). Social networks marked by strong ties, high familiarity between individuals, and difficulty entering and exiting relationships also mark non-Western cultures (Gelfand & Cai, 2004; Morris, Podolny, & Ariel, 2000). These factors — in addition to a strong emphasis on developing and maintaining relational capital including mutual trust, mutual knowledge and commitment to the relationship (Brett & Gelfand, 2006) — are likely to further contribute to intra-clan loyalties. Officers must be trained to understand and recognize the impact these social and cultural forces have on the actions of local leaders with regard to the allocation of work contracts. Clear organizational policies concerning the extent and circumstances under which officers may deviate, if at all, from Army contracting regulations as they attempt to address the culturally bounded preferences of their Iraqi counterparts would ease this challenge.

Negotiating Work Arrangements in the Face of Diverse Cultural Values and Norms

Officers noted several key challenges resulting from cultural differences between their own approach and that of their Iraqi counterparts with respect to project management, managing meetings and social interactions, and basic assumptions as to what may become subject for negotiation.

Managing work projects and meetings in the face of a relaxed approach to schedules and personal accountability. Officers reported facing the difficulty of promoting a disciplined project management approach to work plans within a culture that they perceived to embrace a more relaxed approach to time and personal accountability. Officers reported that their Iraqi counterparts often expressed hope rather than personal commitment to fulfilling the terms of agreements, indicating that their success was primarily in “God’s hands” (“inshallah”) instead of their own control.

When conducting meetings with Iraqi counterparts, officers reported that Iraqis possess a different sense of time than individuals from the United States. Meetings seldom started on time, and typically lasted well beyond the planned schedule. Officers reported feeling frustrated with having to accept the cultural norms and Iraqi approaches to time (e.g., “Drove me crazy in the beginning,” “They did not show up on time for a grand opening with a two star General”). Some officers attempted to create incentives for Iraqi counterparts to arrive earlier to meetings, such as holding one-on-one conversations with Iraqi counterparts who arrived early prior to the beginning of a group meetings.

Training and development focus: Researchers have observed a non-Western cultural bias for situational attributions referring to a tendency to explain causes of individual’s actions in terms of *concrete situations*, which refer to a specific constraint or opportunity that the individual is facing in their immediate operating environment (e.g. financial troubles); *temporal occasions* representing events occurring in the larger environment that are likely to impact individuals or decisions (e.g. oil prices have increased dramatically); and the influence of social context (e.g., social norms or roles) (Brett & Gelfand, 2006; Geertz, 1975). This is in contrast to a Western bias for dispositional attributions, namely, a tendency to attribute the causes of actions or events to individual’s choice and judgment and to underestimate the impact of situational

factors (Ross, 1977). The former is consistent with Iraqi's tendency to view their ability to succeed as at least somewhat outside of their personal control and the latter can explain U.S. officers' tendency to view Iraqis' perspective as indicative of low personal accountability.

Cultural differences in the tolerance of ambiguity and unstructured situations may also contribute to differences between Iraqi and U.S. perspectives about work plans, schedules, and project completion (Hofstede, 1989). Both U.S. and military cultures are likely to reduce officers' tolerance of uncertainty concerning work and meeting schedules, which might in turn contribute to negative perceptions of Iraqis who are comfortable with higher degrees of ambiguity about task completion.

A training program preparing officers for the development of collaborative work arrangements with Iraqi counterparts must inform them of these cultural differences and their likely impact on their own expectations. Several officers suggested during their interviews that teaching officers basic project management skills and providing them with actionable ideas of how they may reward and reinforce stronger project management discipline among members of the local population with whom they must collaborate may help in facing this challenge. Specifically, these officers thought that a project management approach which emphasizes the development of a timeline for the accomplishment of key project milestones combined with a set of rewards to be administered to Iraqis when they meet this preset timeline could encourage the latter to adhere more carefully to their commitments and reduce the cultural impact of a relaxed approach to time and deadlines. The attachment of rewards to the accomplishments of project milestones was thought to counter the cultural tendency to emphasize situational attributions for failures and to reinforce personal accountability among the Iraqi counterparts.

Fostering rapport in the face of unfamiliar nonverbal symbols and a cultural emphasis on honor and dignity. To foster rapport with Iraqi counterparts, officers found it necessary to allow time for "small talk" and discussions on topics unrelated to the formal agenda in the beginning of meetings (e.g. discuss the overall situation or ask about family). They also found it important to spend time drinking tea and socializing with their counterparts, as well as to avoid expressing anger directly since Iraqis would likely perceive this as a deep insult.

Officers reported that the head sheik or other local leader tended to do most of the talking in negotiations involving teams. The honorable seat around the table was to the right of the head leader position, and the second honorable seat was to the left. Officers stressed the importance of respecting these nonverbal customs, and others such as avoiding sitting with crossed legs or arms, accepting Iraqis' comfort with little personal space, and their use of touch (e.g. striking the shoulders) as a friendly gesture. Other cultural manners found to be important included using the right hand when eating from a common plate; speaking to the eldest man in the house when entering homes and by following normative grieving customs such as buying and delivering a sheep to the family of an Iraqi Soldier killed in action.

Training and development focus: To prepare officers to foster rapport in managing work meetings and developing collaborations with members of the local population, a training program should inform officers of the cultural values of social harmony, hierarchy and respect of elderly (Abu Nimer, 1996; Hofstede, 1980; Schwartz, 1994) that are dominant in non-Western

cultures. Officers would need to understand that in non-Western cultures the development of relational capital is often viewed as essential and is used as a criterion to evaluate satisfaction with the negotiation process and outcomes (Brett & Gelfand, 2006).

Differences in perspectives as to what is negotiable. Several officers reported encountering surprising demands made by Iraqi civilians, which they attributed to cultural norms that encourage negotiation over almost everything and/or to opportunistic acts aimed to maximize personal gains. One instance was a mother who demanded compensation for the loss of her son killed during an attack against U.S. forces. In another instance, the owner of a small workshop requested compensation due to loss of property. The workshop was being used by insurgents to manufacture weapons and U.S. forces destroyed the building during a security operation.

Training and development focus: The cultural bias toward situational rather than personal attributions in explaining loss may account for what U.S. officers viewed as excessive or inappropriate Iraqi demands. Additional research would need to confirm this possibility.

As part of their preparation to serve in Iraq or other foreign locations officers must be informed of the type of demands that may be made by local civilians or security personnel. In addition, there is a need to develop clear organizational guidelines that define what may become subject for negotiation between U.S. military personnel and members of the local population, as well as how to respond to unusual demands.

Negotiating Under Threat and Balancing the Use of Power and Collaborative Gestures

Officers reported several situations focusing on the difficulty of negotiating in the face of threat to themselves or their Iraqi counterpart. A related set of challenges focused on the need to find effective ways to balance the use of power or threat capacity with collaborative gestures in dealing with local civilians. Officers also faced concerns over who they could trust in an environment where enemy and non-enemy elements are hard to differentiate, as well as what concessions to make while maintaining an image of strength.

Control the inclination to employ military power and threat capacity. Officers often described the challenge they felt in having to control their inclination to use their military power and threat capacity to resolve disagreements faster and with less concessions rather than through more balanced negotiations. Most recognized the likely negative impact of their use of threat capacity on the development of mutually satisfying agreements and collaborative relationships. Threat of use of force was often seen, however, as necessary to motivate Iraqis resisting collaboration with U.S. forces.

Training and development focus: Officers are likely to benefit from learning about research findings addressing the impact of power disparity in negotiations. In particular it is important to increase their awareness of the tendency of powerful negotiators to employ higher levels of win-lose or pressure tactics, the inclination of weaker parties to resist the influence attempts of the stronger party, and the typical impact of these negotiation behaviors on producing a more competitive process, higher rate of impasses and less mutually satisfying agreements (de

Dreu, Giebels, & van de Vliert, 1998; Lawler, 1992; Lawler & Bacharach, 1987; Lawler & Yoon, 1993; Mannix, 1993). Such awareness may help officers understand and control more effectively their own inclination to use power unproductively.

Combining the use of threat and force protection consideration with care and respect. Closely related to the challenge of controlling the reliance on threat capacity was the difficulty involved in combining the use of threat capacity with collaborative gestures in an attempt to avoid damaging the relationship with local civilians. Officers had to confront contractors who did not complete work on time or that deviated from specifications, stop civilians without adequate permits from crossing checkpoints, or demand that shop owners stop supporting insurgents. These situations required Soldiers to find the right balance between the use of threat and the demonstration of care and respect as a way to maintain collaborative relationships and good will (e.g. threatened shop owners with the closing of the market if they collaborated with insurgents and on the same day provided schools and clinics in the neighborhood with supplies).

Some officers reported looking for methods to conduct security operations in ways that would enable them to minimize the damaging impact of necessary security actions on their relationship with civilians without excessive risk to Soldiers. For instance, during cordon and search operations, if possible, they knocked on the door rather than forcibly entering; treated family members, especially women, with respect; minimized damage to the house; and did not tie hands of suspected members in front of friends or family to avoid humiliation.

Training and development focus: Negotiation training focusing on the use of verbal (i.e. choice of words) and nonverbal communication (e.g. body position, eye contact) can help officers learn to communicate power, confidence and domination with regard to specific issues while expressing politeness, deference and respect to the person (Gibbons, Bradak, & Busch, 1992). Communication training must be informed, however, by cultural differences in verbal and nonverbal communication patterns. Soldiers must also be trained to evaluate risk factors during security operations and to assess the value of minimizing damage to the relationship against force protection considerations.

Minimize threat to Iraqi counterparts. Several officers referred to the challenge of ensuring the security of Iraqi counterparts who were involved in negotiating security or other issues with them. Iraqi counterparts reported receiving threats for their safety or the safety of their family from (1) members of their own clan, (2) organizations wanting to ensure that American resources would be allocated to meet their needs, and (3) from other Iraqis who viewed them as traitors for dealing with U.S. forces. For instance, an interviewee discussed how academic department heads threatened the head of a college who had negotiated with a U.S. officer as a way to pressure him to support their demands for budgets and supplies. As another example, members of a neighborhood advisory council reported receiving threats intended to influence their votes. Interpreters who played a central role in enabling negotiations also were often reported as receiving threats. Iraqi negotiators responded to these threats in different ways, ranging from hardening their positions during the negotiation with U.S. officers as a way to satisfy the demands of those who threatened them, to expressing serious hesitations, and to actually withdrawing from their role as negotiators.

Training and development focus: Officers must be provided with tactical practices that can help them negotiate and collaborate with members of the local population who are experiencing threat. For example, Soldiers reported using raids to enter homes as a way to be able to speak to residents freely without making them look to others as though they were collaborating with U.S. forces.

Who to trust? The Iraqis' vague and secretive negotiation style, coupled with the general difficulty in distinguishing between hostile and friendly civilians, posed a serious challenge to U.S. Soldiers with respect to which Iraqi negotiators could be trusted. Some of the officers reported devising ways to test the trustworthiness of their Iraqi counterparts.

Training and development focus: The decision as to how much to trust the opponent is one of the most fundamental dilemmas in negotiation situations (Kelly, 1966). Recent research indicated that different levels of closeness in a relationship is likely to be associated with different types of trust and suggested actions to increase each type of trust, or to manage distrust. "Calculus-based" trust often marks early phases of relationship and is founded on the assumption that individuals are likely to act in a trustworthy manner when they expect to gain more from preserving than from severing the relationship (Lewicki & Bunker, 1995, 1996). This form of trust appears especially applicable for managing relationships in conflict zones where the mix of enemy/non-enemy elements and the prevalence of threat make it hard to develop "identification-based" trust—trust that is built upon shared objectives and values and involves genuine care and concern between individuals (Lewicki & Bunker, 1995, 1996). Teaching officers how to increase calculus-based trust (e.g. pointing to the benefits that each party can gain by keeping their promises) and how to manage calculus-based distrust appears especially useful in preparing Soldiers for negotiations in conflict zone areas (Lewicki, McAllister, & Bies, 1998; Lewicki & Stevenson, 1998).

What to exchange and what concessions to make. Officers pointed to the need to be prepared to make some concession in order to strengthen relationships with influential leaders (e.g. release to them one weapon from those that were confiscated, promise to check on the location of detainees, or release detainees if appropriate). They emphasized the need to consider carefully, however, what concessions to make as a way to avoid setting undesirable precedents affecting future negotiations with the same Iraqi or different Iraqis and to prevent an impression of operating out of weakness. For example, not taking tanks on a certain route as demanded by local residents due to noise disturbances may be interpreted as weakness by some Iraqis and hinder later negotiations.

Training and development focus: Negotiation theorists and practitioners make multiple recommendations regarding the use of concession-making as a way to increase one's advantage over the other in a competitive negotiation situation or to avoid creating an image of weakness (Hendon, Roy, & Ahmed, 2003). Teaching officers concession techniques, such as starting with sufficiently high demands to allow room for concessions; being first to concede on a minor issue but not the first to concede on a major issue; and avoiding making concessions too soon, too often or too much, can help prepare Soldiers to use concessions effectively.

Self Management: Emotional Regulation and Adaptability during Negotiations

Several officers pointed to challenges involved in managing one's emotional reactions and adapting to competing demands while negotiating with local civilians.

Negotiating in the face of personal feelings of loss, anger and frustration. In more volatile areas, Soldiers reported finding themselves required to negotiate with Iraqis while experiencing anger and grief associated with injury to or loss of fellow Soldiers. Soldiers reported that anger often created a desire to seek revenge as a means to correct injustice or to deter future attacks. They recognized, however, that these feelings made it even more difficult to control the inclination to use their power and threat capacity during negotiations.

Training and development focus: To prepare Soldiers to negotiate effectively in the face of grief and anger, training programs need to inform participants about research findings addressing the impact of emotions on negotiation behavior. Research suggests that positive affect contributes to cooperative behavior and high joint benefits, while negative affect is associated with competitive, win-lose tactics (Barry, Smithey Fulmer, & Goats, 2006; Isen, 1987). Anger in particular has been found to reduce negotiators' regard for their opponents' interests, lower joint benefits (Allred, Mallozzi, & Raia, 1997) and reduce desire for future interactions with the opponent (Barry & Oliver, 1996). Increasing officer awareness of the impact that emotions have on negotiation behavior, negotiation outcomes, and social cognition (Albarracin & Kumkale, 2003; Tiedens & Linton, 2001) also should be accompanied by a developmental focus on emotional control and self-regulation.

Complexity, adaptability and simultaneous response to competing demands. U.S. Soldiers who negotiate with Iraqis must attend simultaneously to the different and sometimes competing demands and mindsets involved in warfighting/force protection on the one hand and fostering collaboration with locals on the other hand. Soldiers must maintain high levels of situational awareness and be prepared to respond tactically to threats, while at the same time engaging in the seemingly antithetical responses of fostering rapport and trust with their Iraq counterparts. Officers and Soldiers must, therefore, develop adaptive capacity and mental agility (Bennis, 2003; Wong, 2004) that will enable them to respond quickly and intelligently to the competing demands resulting from their complex set of roles (e.g. nation building vs. insurgency fighting). Performing effectively in a diverse set of roles also requires Soldiers to master a wide range of information and skills outside their combat specialty. Moreover, junior officers must often perform these roles with limited detailed guidance from superiors because geographical dispersion, changing tactical and strategic situations, and volatile environments may prevent higher level commanders from formulating detailed plans and directions (Wong, 2004).

Training and development focus: Adaptability and mental agility involve a diverse behavioral repertoire (behavioral complexity) that enables the selection of appropriate responses to situational demands. Behavioral complexity requires cognitive complexity, and cognitive complexity involves both *differentiation* and *integration*. Differentiation refers to the number of concepts and dimensions that Soldiers use in the perception of the physical and social environment, while integration addresses the Soldiers' ability to combine these dimensions in resolving unfamiliar challenges (Day & Lance, 2004; Hooijberg, Hunt, & Dodge, 1997; Zaccaro,

1999). Time and resource constraints suggest that formal training programs can have a slow and limited effect in developing officers' behavioral repertoire and the adaptability necessary to meet the demands of the complex set of roles they must perform. This suggests that in addition to a formal training program, officers must be presented with tools, time, and incentives to engage in individual self-reflection and group after action reviews to facilitate their ability to learn from-on-the-job experiences.

Negotiation Challenges Summary

The findings of this exploratory investigation indicate that military officers who engage in negotiations with members of the local population are likely to encounter a wide variety of challenges. Officers face the need to mediate disputes between local leaders and to negotiate impartial agreements in the face of pressure from competing leaders and groups. They are required to make ethical judgments when negotiating agreements with local leaders whose behaviors are sometimes guided by cultural values and norms inconsistent with U.S. military rules and regulations. Officers must attend to and consider local customs and traditions in negotiating agreements concerning collaborative projects, while participating in meetings with local leaders. They must find ways to protect their own safety and that of their local negotiation counterparts, develop ways to assess their counterpart's trustworthiness when enemy and non-enemy elements are hard to distinguish, and balance the threat of use of military force with collaborative gestures as they attempt to foster cooperation and minimize damage for their relationships with local individuals and groups. Finally, they must negotiate in the face of grief or anger and integrate effectively both war-fighting and negotiation skills to ensure that they can respond adaptively to the large set of roles and responsibilities associated with their mission.

Instructional programs aimed to prepare officers to negotiate effectively with members of the local population must help officers recognize these challenges and provide them with the knowledge and tools to address such challenges. Specifically, we propose that officers preparing to manage these negotiation challenges are likely to benefit from learning about negotiation theory and research findings addressing the characteristics of effective mediation processes and useful third-party conflict resolution techniques; the impact of cross-cultural values and norms on negotiators' assumptions, motives and strategies; the influence of power disparity on negotiators' behaviors and outcomes; key forms of interpersonal trust; and the impact and control of emotions on negotiation behavior and outcomes. Officers are also likely to benefit from the development of a variety of negotiation and interpersonal skills with special emphasis on mediation procedures, integrative and distributive bargaining tactics, cross-cultural interaction skills, negotiation communication techniques, calculus-based trust-building tactics, and project management strategies. Officers must also learn self-management skills addressing emotional regulation and self-reflection techniques as a means to enhance learning from on-the-job experiences.

In addition to knowledge and skills, military organizations must develop a clear set of guiding policies and rules affecting cross-cultural military negotiations. These include directions concerning potential violation of military rules in the face of cross-cultural differences in ethical and behavioral norms, and clear policy guidelines as to what is negotiable. A summary of the

challenges reported and negotiation research knowledge, skills and organizational policies that are likely to facilitate officers efforts' in managing these challenges is presented in Table 1.

Table 1
Summary of Negotiation Challenges and Training Development Foci

Negotiation Challenges	Training and Development Focus
<u>Negotiation and Mediation in the Face of Strife</u>	
Mediating disputes and negotiating impartial agreements.	Learn about the characteristics of mediation processes and develop effective mediation skills informed by earlier military third party interventions (e.g., in the Balkans).
<u>Ethical Judgment in the Face of Conflicting Cultural Values and Norms</u>	
Developing agreements with individuals from cultures that value personal gains, power and nepotism.	Inform officers of non-Western and Middle Eastern cultural values and norms. Provide clear organizational policies and direction concerning the extent and circumstances under which officers may deviate, if at all, from Army contracting rules.
Lack of control over Iraqi leaders who wield power and status derived from contact with U.S. forces.	Emphasize the value of building relationships with multiple members of specific communities to facilitate monitoring.
<u>Negotiating Work Arrangements in the Face of Conflicting Cultural Values and Norms</u>	
Instituting project management discipline with cultures that adopt a relaxed approach to developing and adhering to work schedules and personal accountability.	Teach basic project management skills and provide ideas to reinforce project management discipline among local civilians.
Managing meetings in a culture that adopts a relaxed approach to time and highlights the importance of social customs.	Increase cross-cultural awareness regarding differences in approach to time and causal attributions.
Expressing respect and developing agreements in a culture that adopts unfamiliar nonverbal symbols and emphasizes the importance of honor and dignity.	Increase cross-cultural awareness regarding social structure and values of social harmony and hierarchy
Differences between U.S. and Iraq perspectives as to what is negotiable.	Provide clear organizational guidelines, informed by cultural differences, on what may become subject for negotiation

Table 1 Continued

Negotiation Challenges	Training and Development Focus
<p align="center"><u>Negotiating in the Face of Threat and Volatility: Balancing the Use of Power and Collaborative Gestures</u></p>	
Controlling the inclination to employ military power and threat.	Learn about the impact of power disparity in negotiations.
Balancing the use of threat with care and respect.	Include negotiation communication training focusing on the use of verbal and nonverbal communication to project power, confidence and domination with regard to specific issues while expressing politeness, deference and respect to the person.
Balancing force protection considerations and a respectful approach during security operations.	Train Soldiers to evaluate risk factors and to assess the value minimizing damage to the relationship against force protection consideration.
Minimizing threat to Iraqi counterparts.	Share tactical techniques (e.g., using raids to enter homes as a way to be able to speak to residents freely).
Identifying who is trustworthy.	Share negotiation research regarding different forms of interpersonal trust and teach how increase calculus-based trust and how to manage calculus-based distrust.
Determining what to exchange and what concessions to make.	Inform Soldiers of the findings of negotiation research addressing concession patterns and teach concession strategies.
<p align="center"><u>Personal Growth: Self-Management and Adaptability</u></p>	
Negotiating while experiencing feelings of loss, anger, and grief.	Inform trainees of research on the impact of negative emotions on negotiation behavior and teach self-management and emotional regulation techniques.
Employing behavioral and cognitive complexity and adaptability; responding appropriately to competing demands.	In addition to participation in formal training programs, encourage the use of individual self-reflection and group After Action Review processes to facilitate officer propensity to learn from on-the-job experiences.

**Iraqi Negotiation Techniques:
Cultural Norms or Distributive Negotiation Maneuvers?**

Overall, U.S. Soldiers perceived most Iraqi leaders or residents that they came into contact with as guided by the desire to maximize their benefits with little or no concern for the U.S. military needs or goals. Officers reported a long list of negotiation techniques used by the

Iraqis that they perceived as manipulative distributive tactics aimed to cause U.S. Soldiers to give in to Iraqis' demands. Similar to findings reported in the negotiation literature on the effects of pressure tactics, misrepresentation, and deception (Lewicki et al., 2006), several officers reported disappointment and frustration by what they believed to be a common Iraqi exploitative approach to negotiations.

The list of individual influence tactics reported by U.S. officers to be employed by Iraqis appears to be consistent with basic cultural values and normative behaviors in non-Western cultures. One implication of this is that U.S. officers may inadvertently evaluate Iraqi negotiators as exploitative and manipulative (i.e., a stable internal attribution about an Iraqi's character), when Iraqi behavior in negotiation situations is largely guided by cultural norms for how negotiations should be conducted (i.e., not necessarily a stable personality trait). It also points to a key cross-cultural negotiation challenge that U.S. officers confront—discerning the extent to which specific negotiation and interaction patterns represent selfish, distributive tactics or the normative and appropriate influence techniques endorsed by a culture.

Several officers appeared to recognize the challenge of discerning individual negotiation motives from culturally normative behaviors by pointing to the need to be aware of local customs while simultaneously avoiding the tendency to stereotype all Iraqi counterparts as having similar motives and expectations. They emphasized the need to judge each person based on his or her individual actions and adapt one's negotiation approach and tactics to their specific local counterpart. As suggested by one officer, Soldiers "must realize that at the end of the day you are dealing with a single person, not the culture."

In this section we describe key Iraqi influence tactics identified by U.S. military officers and consider non-Western cultural assumptions and behavioral norms that potentially underlie them. We propose that preparing officers for their negotiation roles should include recognition of influence techniques likely to be employed by members of the local population and understanding the cultural context that guide these techniques.

Emphasize Personal Status, Power and Influence within the Community

Officers reported that Iraqi counterparts tended to present themselves as important figures with influence over their own village or neighborhood and who could help Americans secure community support or find valuable information. Some Iraqis labeled themselves imams or sheiks even when they were not recognized as such by others, as discovered later by U.S. officers. Actual sheiks often came to meetings with a large entourage, suggesting a prominent position. Closely related was a tendency of some Iraqis, especially retired senior military officers, to speak about the high-status positions they held in the past within the military. Iraqis also made attempts to elevate their status by dropping names of high-level American officers or officials they had met. Ordinary residents sometimes attempted to strengthen their influence and power in negotiations by bringing sheiks or other dignitaries to advocate their needs.

Officers perceived these behaviors as influence tactics aimed to maximize satisfaction of Iraqis' demands, and some viewed these negotiation techniques to be manipulative and exploitative. However, an examination of Middle Eastern values and norms indicates that

relying on a dignitary is consistent with the patriarchal and hierarchical values that dominate societies where neighborhood leaders and dignitaries are expected to play a central negotiation and mediation role in resolving disputes (Abu Nimer, 1996). This suggests that when faced with local counterparts who emphasize their personal status during negotiations, officers must discern whether this behavior represents an attempt by the counterparts to establish the legitimacy of their roles as negotiators in accordance with cultural custom, whether it is a pure distributive tactic aimed to motivate officers to concede to self-serving demands, or a combination of both.

Appeal to Emotions

Officers reported that Iraqi counterparts often attempted to persuade them to respond favorably to their demands by appealing to the officers' emotions. They talked about the risk that they and their families were exposed to, poor living conditions, or their long wait for improvements. Women often brought little children along, or cried in meetings with civil affairs officers. U.S. officers perceived this to be a distributive maneuver aimed at gaining concessions from the Americans.

In contrast to Western cultures that emphasize rational arguments as a dominant persuasive tactic and view emotional appeal as an inappropriate, ethically questionable tactic (Barry, 1999), non-Western cultures recognize emotional appeals as normative behaviors. Emotional appeals in non-Western societies are often aimed at sending implicit messages to the other party, reminding that party of their status and responsibilities within the social order (Brett & Gelfand, 2006). High-status parties are expected to respond with some level of concession to emotional appeals as part of a social obligation on the part of the stronger party to help lower-status parties in need.

Emotional appeal is also consistent with non-Western high-context communication styles (Hall, 1976). A *high-context* communication style emphasizes indirect and implicit communication where meaning is conveyed, not just by words, but also by the *context* in which certain behaviors are observed. Officers confronted by emotional appeals must be able therefore be able to discern if these appeals represent normative influence attempts, excessive manipulative maneuvers, or a combination of both. That is, officers must determine if the behavior is more contextually driven, personality driven, or a mixture of personal goals and context in order to be effective in negotiations.

Strong and Persisting Demands Combined with Dismissals of Previous Help

Officers reported that most Iraqi counterparts seldom ever acknowledged previous support or improvements in civil services or infrastructure made by the American military. Instead, they regularly held the Americans responsible for all failures and asked for more help and support. U.S. officers perceived the discounting of American efforts as an influence technique aimed to create a sense of guilt or obligation in the Americans that may lead to increased willingness to satisfy Iraqi demands.

Holding Americans responsible for failure to satisfy their needs is consistent with non-Western cultural expectations concerning the obligation of high-status authority to help lower-

status members of society. This expectation is also consistent with a collectivist perspective which emphasizes the responsibility of the group or the state to care for the individual. This is in contrast to individualistic cultures that encourage independence and personal responsibility for the satisfaction of individual needs (Hofstede, 1991). Blaming U.S. Soldiers for any absence of progress in their living conditions may also reflect a non-Western tendency to make situational (i.e., emphasize situational factors and social context) as compared to dispositional (i.e., assuming personal responsibility) attributions in explaining causes of events (Brett & Gelfand, 2006). High demands and blame may, therefore, reflect cultural expectations, an individual's strategy to exert pressure and maximize gains, or both. In responding to Iraqis' complaints about insufficient progress in security or infrastructure reconstruction, several U.S. officers reported having to find ways to express sympathy for difficulties while avoiding making commitments for improvements over which they did not have full control.

Expanding the Agenda and Surprise Requests

Somewhat related to the previously described influence tactics, officers reported a tendency of Iraqi counterparts to bring up new issues and demands that were not part of the original agenda. As one Soldier noted, "we came to speak about security or express sympathy about loss of a family member and they bring up work contracts they would like to have." Iraqis would tend to bring up these demands, often at the last minute, just as the negotiation discussions appeared to come to its end. Officers perceived this as an attempt to take advantage of Americans' desire to conclude the already prolonged discussion in hope that they would agree to a final demand.

In Western societies surprising, last minute demands labeled "nibbles" (Cohen, 1980) are used as a distributive tactic to create time pressure that will lead to concessions by the surprised party. In non-Western societies, however, a more relaxed approach to time and deadlines in a polychronic¹ organization of events (Hall & Hall, 1990) suggests that the unexpected expansion of the negotiation agenda toward the end of a meeting may reflect normative behavior. That is, while Americans find broadening the agenda toward the end of a negotiation to be surprising, Iraqis who negotiate with one another might be surprised if broadening the agenda did *not* occur. Officers must learn to discern to what extent any surprising, last minute demands that they encounter represent culturally expected behavior, a manipulative pressure tactic, or a combination of both. When Iraqis made excessive demands or added issues and demands to the agenda unexpectedly, Soldiers reported looking for ways to refocus conversation on key issues, politely and firmly.

Secrecy, Ambiguity, and Multiple Agendas

Several officers reported that many Iraqis seemed secretive and ambiguous about their true needs and motives. Officers remarked that Iraqis make "great poker players," and "Every thing is gray. They never say yes or no. Every thing is open for negotiation." This made it difficult for U.S. officers to recognize underlying interests of their Iraqi counterparts, and inhibited the use of integrative tactics to develop agreements that best addressed both sides' needs.

¹ Simultaneous scheduling of multiple activities as opposed to sequential scheduling of multiple activities.

Officers tended to interpret the secrecy of their Iraqi counterparts as evasiveness aimed to cover selfish motives, or as desire to maximize personal control over resources obtained from the Americans as a way to enhance leadership status within the community. Several officers thought that secrecy was also used as a means to prevent Americans from fully understanding the implications of negotiated agreements on the web of relationship and power balance within and across neighborhoods or villages.

Secrecy and ambiguity could also reflect, however, a non-Western emphasis on high-context, implicit and indirect communication styles, which are in contrast to Western communication styles that involve a low-context, direct and explicit exchange of information (Brett & Gelfand, 2006). This suggests that officers who encounter secrecy and ambiguity during negotiations with members of the local population must look for ways to determine if they represent normative behaviors or distributive negotiation tactics.

Indirect Expressions of Anger and Frustration

Despite the aggressive nature of some of the influence techniques employed by Iraqis, the tone of most conversations with Americans remained non-confrontational and polite. Consistent with studies revealing a preference in non-Western cultures for expressing conflict in indirect ways, both verbally and behaviorally (Brett, 2001), Iraqi counterparts appeared more likely to express their frustration or anger to the interpreter instead of confronting Americans directly.

Exaggeration, Deception and Inconsistent Messages

Iraqis appeared to use exaggerations to justify requests (e.g., claim that there was no water in the entire village when there only was a problem in a limited area, “use outlandish stories”). Many officers felt that deceptions aimed to benefit the welfare of a clan or the local communities were culturally acceptable to the Iraqis.

Officers also encountered situations in which Iraqi counterparts utilized inconsistent, “two-faced” messages—one to U.S. forces and one to local groups. One officer noted that Iraqis would “tell each group what it wants to hear.” Another officer indicated that Iraqis would “incite hostility in sermons and deny it to Americans.” Such inconsistent messages may reflect high tolerance for contradictions apparent in non-Western societies. This tolerance results from a recognition that each person is part of multiple contexts and expected to fulfill certain roles within these contexts that may not be always be totally compatible (Kitayama & Markus, 1999). While such behavior and conflicting messages are perceived as inauthentic (Chan, Hannah, & Gardner, 2004), manipulative and deceptive in Western contexts, these same behaviors may represent a more culturally acceptable activity in Iraq.

Officers reported learning to use verbal and nonverbal cues to detect misrepresentations. Several officers reported that to preserve the relationship and enable the Iraqi counterpart to save face (i.e., avoid humiliation and shame), they often avoided direct confrontation of exaggerations or misrepresentations, and instead redirected the discussion to substantive matters.

Implicit, Subtle Threats

A number of officers indicated that Iraqis made subtle threats about disruptions likely to interfere with the U.S. forces' ability to maintain peace and security if Iraqi demands were not met. There were several reports in which threats focused on the safety of American Soldiers (e.g., "there will be blood in the streets; a mob may come to the base's gate, your Soldiers may be in danger").

Soldiers indicated that all threats were addressed immediately to ensure safety. Although it is unclear to what extent threat represents a culturally acceptable influence technique, several officers suggested that it is likely that in a country controlled for many years by a dictatorial regime and oppressing security organizations that those coercive influence tactics may be more culturally acceptable.

Meeting Before a Meeting and Turning U.S. Officers against Competing Groups

Officers were sometimes invited to neighborhood advisory council (NAC) meetings earlier than the actual meeting time as a way for council members to have "private time" with officers in an attempt to gain more favor for their group. Occasionally, these meetings were used to portray leaders from competing groups as unreliable and to damage their reputation in the hope of gaining more for one's own group.

Collaborating Through Exchange of Offers

Officers reported finding collaborative negotiation behaviors on the part of their Iraqi counterparts to involve both low levels of trust and minimal disclosure of information concerning their underlying needs and interests. Collaborations primarily involved the exchange of offers, reciprocal concessions, splitting differences, and the development of compromises instead of integrative solutions. Reliance on the exchange of offers coupled with minimal open discussion of the parties' underlying interests is consistent with a non-Western, high-context, proposal-based approach to negotiations, where information about negotiators' priorities is shared through the offers each makes rather than through direct discussion of needs and interests (Adair, 2004; Adair & Brett, 2005). It should be noted that U.S. officers also were inclined to maintain secrecy and avoid open exchange of information about underlying concerns and interests. This primarily was due to force protection considerations, as well as having to respond and integrate the demands of different sectarian groups.

Collaboration with Iraqis occurred primarily through exchange of offers concerning resources or benefits. Iraqis agreed to fulfill the requests of Americans in exchange for valuable resources or opportunities such as:

- Money
- Jobs
- Influence over project assignment to contractors
- Letters of recommendation from U.S. officers to be used in dealing with other U.S. officers or Iraqi officials

- The opportunity to be present in certain celebrations or ceremonial openings
- Access to American officers or opportunities to meet with officers
- Permits for carrying weapons
- Information about or the release of detainees
- Medical care for relatives
- Barbed wire

Examples of such exchanges included promises by neighborhood leaders to maintain order in the streets, and perhaps even prevent attacks, in exchange for financial resources or weapon permits. Iraqis also might agree to provide intelligence in exchange for services, weapons or money. As one officer noted, “If you want to see in the dark, you need to pay for the flashlight.” Often, Iraqi counterparts were more likely to provide security information affecting individuals outside their own clan.

The emphasis on exchange as a means of collaboration suggests that instructional programs aimed to prepare military officers for cross-cultural negotiations should focus more on developing their ability to infer directly the preferences, needs and interests of their negotiation counterparts from their offers, as well as from counterparts’ reactions to offers made by the U.S.

Iraqi Influence Techniques: Summary

In sum, multiple Iraqi negotiation techniques appear consistent with non-Western cultural norms. This suggests that U.S. perceptions of Iraqi influence techniques as individually driven negotiation maneuvers aimed to extract concessions may not be fully accurate. Cultural norms that may account for the use of specific influence techniques by Iraqis include (1) relying on community dignitaries in resolving conflict, (2) use of emotional appeals as a way of reminding and reinforcing role expectations and social obligations, (3) collectivist perspectives which emphasize the responsibility of the group to care for the individual, (4) a relaxed and polychronic approach to time and scheduling, (5) situational vs. dispositional attributions, (6) high-context, implicit and indirect communication approaches, (7) preference for indirect forms of confrontation, (8) tolerance of contradictions, and (9) collaboration through the exchange of offers rather than direct exchange of information. Awareness of cultural assumptions and norms is therefore essential to facilitate U.S. officers’ ability to discern the extent to which specific negotiation acts represent a culturally normative response, an individually motivated distributive tactic, or both. A summary of key Iraqi negotiation tactics identified by U.S. military officers and non-Western cultural norms that could potentially underlie those tactics are presented in Table 2.

Table 2
Iraqi Negotiation Tactics and Associated Non-Western Expectations and Norms

Iraqi Negotiation Tactics	Associated Non-Western Expectations, Values, and Norms
Emphasize personal status, power and influence within the community	Neighborhood leaders and dignitaries are expected to play a central negotiation and mediation role in resolving disputes within patriarchal, Middle Eastern societies
Appeal to emotions	High-context communication style emphasizes indirect and implicit communication where meaning is conveyed not just by words but by the context in which certain behaviors are observed
Highly demanding, always ask for more, discount or ignore previous help	Obligation of high status authority to help lower status members of society as well as a collectivist perspective which emphasizes the role of the group or the state to care for the individual. Tendency to make situational as compared to dispositional attributions for causes of failure.
Expand the agenda, surprise	A polychronic (simultaneous vs. sequential scheduling of multiple activities) approach to time
Secrecy, ambiguity and multiple agendas	Emphasis on high-context, implicit and indirect communication approach
Indirect expression of anger and frustration	Anger and conflict are expressed in indirect verbal and behavioral ways
Exaggeration, deception and inconsistent messages	High tolerance of contradictions resulting from a recognition that each person is part of multiple contexts and expected to fulfill multiple roles which may not be always totally compatible
Implicit, subtle threat	A common coercive tactic used by dictatorial regime and oppressing security organizations
Meeting before a meeting and turning U.S. officers against competing groups	Cultural importance placed on status and clan loyalty
Fostering collaboration through exchange of offers and limited direct information exchange	High-context, proposal-based approach to negotiations

CONCLUSION

With recent Counterinsurgency Doctrine (2006) serving as a notable exception, traditional military leadership doctrine has focused primarily on battlefield tactical proficiency and on leadership acts aimed to provide Soldiers with purpose, direction, motivation and inspiration necessary to ensure successful mission completion. Current operations in Iraq and Afghanistan involving counterinsurgency, peace-keeping, stability and support missions and nation building tasks have increased interest in the value of cross-cultural interaction and negotiation skills as a central competency of military leadership. The findings of this exploratory research and other anecdotal evidence suggest that basic and cross-cultural negotiation skills are key elements of this competency. As suggested by interviews with U.S. officers, successful military negotiations are critical to ensure effective completion of peaceful missions such as nation building as well as for collecting intelligence and building the local support necessary to succeed in fighting insurgents. Therefore, recognizing the challenges involved in negotiating successfully with members of the local population and learning effective behavioral techniques to address them represent key developmental areas necessary to prepare U.S. Soldiers to win both the war, and the relationships with local civilians.

The findings presented in this paper provides a conceptual framework capturing the issues that may likely become subject for negotiation between military officers and members of the local population, the challenges associated with negotiations over these issues, and the various common negotiation techniques employed by local individuals. The goal of this research was to begin to identify the characteristics of negotiations between military personnel and members of the local population and to guide the design of pre-deployment negotiation skills-training programs to prepare officers to conduct stability and support operations.

The current exploratory research involved several limitations that must be noted. These include a small convenience sample, qualitative data, and reliance on U.S. Army officers' perceptions that can be expected to be influenced by Western cultural values, beliefs and behavioral norms (Brett & Gelfand, 2006). Notwithstanding these caveats, this research provides initial insight into the characteristics of negotiations with non-combatants as well as areas of negotiation knowledge and skills that must be addressed in pre-deployment negotiation skills training programs.

Pre-deployment Negotiation Skills Program for Officers: Key Components

We propose that an instructional program aimed to prepare officers for their negotiations with noncombatants must address the fundamental principles of negotiation behavior, with added emphasis on specific aspects of the negotiation process relevant for military personnel operating in high risk, cross-cultural operational areas. We turn now to offer insights on the key principles and components of such a training program.

Fundamental principles of negotiation. Following existing conceptualizations, a training program must thoroughly teach the two central paradigms of distributive and integrative negotiation behaviors (Pruitt, 1981, 1998). Officers must be introduced to the distributive framework, which views negotiation situations as win-lose or adversarial in nature. They need to

learn to recognize win-lose bargaining tactics employed by their opponents, which are aimed to claim value by lowering the focal person's aspirations (Lax & Sebenius, 1986). They also need to understand when distributive bargaining is an appropriate approach for them to adopt, as well as learn how to effectively employ specific competitive tactics.

A training program would also have to teach officers about the benefits of integrative bargaining in developing mutually satisfying agreements, generating commitment to agreement implementation, and in fostering long term collaboration and stability in the relationship. Officers must be introduced to and practice the use of integrative negotiation tactics such as searching for information about the opponents' underlying interests, fostering trust, and familiarization with the different types of integrative solutions identified in the literature (Fisher & Ury, 1981; Pruitt, 1998). Training programs need to demonstrate to officers the value of integrative negotiations for U.S. military personnel as they attempt to build long-lasting collaboration with members of the local population.

Similar to other negotiation course curricula and sources of theoretical and practical literature covering the field (e.g., Lewicki et al., 2006; Thompson, 2006), course designers should introduce topics that impact negotiation process and outcomes, including power and influence, communication techniques, the influence of cognition and emotion on perception, ethical considerations, and cross-cultural differences in assumptions affecting negotiation behavior.

Areas of special emphasis relevant for military personnel negotiating in high risk, cross cultural operational areas. The findings of this exploratory investigation also point to three major categories of issues that are likely to become subject for negotiations between officers and members of local populations: 1) issues related to neighborhood and institutional improvement projects, 2) security matters, and 3) civil affairs concerns. Officers need to be introduced to these issues and the types of agreements typically negotiated by other military personnel to resolve them, as well as the effectiveness of these agreements.

The summary of the interviews presented in this research point to several key challenges that officers must be prepared to address in conducting negotiations with local civilians during both stability and support and counterinsurgency operations. These challenges and the knowledge, skills and organizational policies required to address them must be emphasized in military pre-deployment negotiation skills training programs. The challenges reported appear to fall into seven major categories including:

- (1) Mediating disputes between local leaders and negotiating impartial agreements in the face of social and ethnic strife.
- (2) Making ethical judgments in the face of conflicting cultural values and norms.
- (3) Considering local customs and traditions in negotiating agreements concerning collaborative projects while participating in meetings with local leaders.
- (4) Attending to security factors affecting the negotiation, including finding ways to protect their own safety and that of their local negotiation counterparts.
- (5) Assessing counterpart trustworthiness when enemy and non-enemy elements are hard to distinguish, and balancing the threat of use of military force with

collaborative gestures in an attempt to foster cooperation with local individuals and groups.

- (6) Negotiating in the face of grief or anger.
- (7) Integrating warfighting and negotiation skills to develop the capacity to respond adaptively to the large set of responsibilities associated with the officer role during deployment.

The analysis presented in this paper suggests that to effectively address these challenges, officers are likely to benefit from instructional programs that inform them of negotiation research findings focusing on the characteristics of effective mediation processes and useful third-party interventions; and the influence of cross cultural values, assumptions, and norms related to causal attributions, relational versus economic capital, hierarchy and social harmony, and emotionality versus rationality. Additional research and knowledge areas highly relevant for the demands placed on officers include the influence of power disparity on negotiators' behaviors and outcomes; key forms of interpersonal trust; and the impact of emotions on negotiation behavior and outcomes. Officers are also likely to benefit from learning a variety of skills including effective mediation procedures; verbal and nonverbal communication techniques aimed to foster an image of a confident, powerful, yet collaborative negotiator; calculus-based trust-building tactics; and project management strategies. Officers must also learn techniques of emotional regulation and self-reflection.

The findings concerning Iraqi negotiation techniques pointed to nine tactics that were perceived by U.S. officers to be guided primarily by distributive motives. The analysis provided in this paper suggests that most of these tactics are consistent with non-Western negotiation assumptions and behaviors and could therefore reflect culturally prescribed negotiation behavior rather than individual motives. Officers must be introduced to these tactics and learn to assess and discern the extent to which specific behaviors may reflect a strong, selfish distributive motivation vs. normative customs. The secrecy and limited direct exchange of information that characterize the behaviors of both members of the local population and military personnel suggest that officers must also learn to infer information about their counterpart's interests and priorities through the pattern of exchange of offers that evolve during the negotiation. Officers must also develop a thorough understanding of the "human terrain" (i.e. the interests of influential leaders and key groups) within their area of operation as a way to form an accurate assessment of the needs of their counterparts.

In addition to focusing on providing officers with negotiation knowledge and skills, senior military leaders must continuously assess the adequacy and appropriateness of guiding policies and rules they impose that affect cross-cultural military negotiations. Officers must be provided with clear guidelines concerning what issues may become subject for negotiations and how to handle potential violations of Army rules in the face of cross-cultural differences in ethics and behavioral norms.

Most importantly, the findings of this investigation point to the value of developing an integrated approach that merges tactical and negotiation training, and points to ways in which these two sets of skills can be combined to advance nation-building and security missions. Tactical use of force and threat capacity may be utilized as a distributive tactic to motivate

potential local civilian counterparts to enter negotiations or to secure those who choose to engage in negotiation with military officers. At the same time, negotiation techniques may facilitate tactical missions requiring collaboration with local civilians, such as the closure of certain areas, or in intelligence gathering operations. The design of pre-deployment negotiation programs must enable officers to increase their capacity to shift flexibly across a complex set of responsibilities involving war fighting, peace building or negotiations by expanding their mental conceptualizations of their roles and by increasing their behavioral repertoires.

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